From Oct. 22 to 24, 1956, representatives of Israel, the United Kingdom, and France met secretly in a villa in Sèvres, on the outskirts of Paris. Their agenda? How to confront Egypt.
Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal earlier that year, and the British and French wanted to regain control of the vital shipping route. Israel, meanwhile, sought to put an end to Arab cross-border terror attacks and Egypt’s blockade of Israeli shipping.
They agreed on the following course of action: Israel would first attack Egypt. Britain and France would then issue an ultimatum demanding each side withdraw and an end to the fighting. Israel would accept while the Egyptians would refuse, at which point the two European powers would enter the war against Egypt.
Such a plan would seem almost inconceivable in today’s political climate. Yet it was this agreement that set the Sinai War of 1956 in motion, the resulting campaign becoming Israel’s first major war since its War of Independence in 1948.
As Israeli soldiers fought on the battlefields of the Sinai peninsula, across the world, in Brooklyn, N.Y., the Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem M. Schneerson, of righteous memory, grappled with the spiritual implications of the war and the events surrounding it.
The Rebbe was then just six years into his leadership of Chabad-Lubavitch, a movement still recovering from the devastation of the Nazi Holocaust and decades of Soviet persecution. Throughout the crisis, he followed developments closely, and issued a steady stream of guidance and encouragement.
The war and international diplomatic struggle that followed bear a striking resemblance to events that have repeatedly unfolded in the 70 years since. Over the decades, a familiar and tragic pattern has been followed: miraculous Israeli military victories are followed by intense international pressure, with Israel then making sweeping political concessions, all to its own detriment.
With Israel once again facing threats on the battlefield and pressure on the diplomatic front, a look back at the Sinai War offers valuable perspective on the lessons that should have been learned—and those that still can.
A Canal At the Center
At the center of the eponymous conflict was a man-made waterway roughly 700 feet wide and 120 miles long: the Suez Canal. Opened in 1869, the canal connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, allowing ships traveling between Europe and Asia to avoid the long journey around the southern tip of Africa. The new route cut thousands of miles and weeks of travel time from some voyages, making the canal one of the world’s most important shipping routes.
The canal was constructed by the Suez Canal Company, in which French investors held a majority of the shares, while Egypt’s ruler, Sa’id Pasha, owned most of the remainder. In 1875, mounting financial difficulties forced his successor, Isma’il Pasha, to sell Egypt’s shares to the British government.
The canal soon became indispensable to British trade and military operations, playing a particularly important role during both world wars. Its political status changed repeatedly over the decades, but Britain’s influence remained substantial. Under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Britain retained the right to station troops in the Canal Zone, even as Egypt enjoyed a measure of independence.
In 1951, Egypt repudiated the treaty and demanded that British forces leave, but Britain refused. It was only after the Egyptian monarchy was overthrown in 1952 that negotiations led to a new agreement. Signed in 1954, the agreement called for British troops to withdraw within 20 months, while allowing Britain to maintain portions of its military base and return under certain circumstances for a period of seven years. The Suez Canal Company, meanwhile, would continue operating the canal until its concession expired in 1968.
Relations between Egypt and the Western powers continued to deteriorate. Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser developed closer ties with the Soviet bloc, including through a major arms deal with Communist Czechoslovakia, raising concerns in both London and Washington. In mid-July 1956, the United States and Britain withdrew their offers to help finance construction of the Aswan High Dam, an ambitious project across the Nile River that was central to Nasser’s plans for Egypt.
Nasser responded on July 26, 1956, by announcing the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Revenue from the canal, he declared, would help finance the new dam. The move caught Britain and France off guard and triggered an international crisis.
Britain viewed the nationalization as a direct threat to its strategic and economic interests. France was equally incensed, both over its substantial stake in the canal and its deepening hostility toward Nasser. Egypt had been providing support to the National Liberation Front (FLN), which was fighting to end French colonial rule in Algeria, and the French government regarded Nasser as a major adversary.
With diplomatic efforts failing to resolve the dispute, Britain and France began preparing for military action against Egypt.
Terror and Blockade
Israel, too, had its own reasons for seeking military action against Egypt. Two issues in particular had brought tensions between the countries to a breaking point.
The first was the escalating campaign of cross-border terrorist attacks carried out by Palestinian guerrillas known as fedayeen. The infiltrations began shortly after Israel’s establishment in 1948. What initially consisted largely of theft and armed robberies developed into increasingly deadly attacks on Jewish civilians, killing hundreds and leaving many more injured over the following years.
Many of the attacks originated in Egyptian territory, particularly the Gaza Strip, which it held until 1967. (The area of Judea and Samaria, on the west bank of the Jordan River, was similarly occupied by Jordan). By 1955, the Egyptian government had begun actively recruiting, training, and supporting the fedayeen units carrying out attacks inside Israel.
Israeli reprisal raids against fedayeen bases and Egyptian military positions failed to put an end to the attacks, and the casualties continued to mount. One of the most devastating attacks took place on April 11, 1956, in the Chassidic village of Kfar Chabad in the center of Israel.
That evening, three Arab terrorists from Gaza entered Kfar Chabad and made their way to the Beit Sefer L’Melacha vocational school. As students and staff were praying the evening service in the school’s synagogue, the terrorists opened fire on the worshippers. Four students and their instructor were murdered in cold blood, and several others were wounded. A fifth student succumbed to his wounds two weeks later.
Israel vigorously protested this brutal and gruesome attack on the world stage. It is worthwhile quoting the urgent telegram the Rebbe sent to President Dwight Eisenhower at the time, which was only recently discovered at the Eisenhower Library. “The cold blooded massacre of Jewish children at prayer in Chabad village in [the] Holy Land must arouse every decent human being,” the Rebbe wrote, continuing:
In [the] name of humanity and especially in [the] name of [the] American and World Chabad movement … of which I have [the] honor to be spiritual leader, including [the] Chabad movement and religious and educational institutions in the Holy Land, I appeal to you from [the] depth of [my] sorrowful heart to do all you can and exert your great influence that effective measures be taken immediately to prevent repetitions of such horrors and safeguard the sacred institutions in the Holy Land.1
The attack was especially devastating to the residents of Kfar Chabad, survivors of Soviet persecution and the horrors of the Holocaust, who had come to Israel hoping to build new lives in safety.
Over the next weeks the Rebbe sent them letters and telegrams of consolation, encouragement, and practical guidance. He urged the residents not to abandon the village, but instead to continue building and expanding its institutions. He later sent a delegation of 12 yeshivah students to Israel as his personal emissaries, their mission to strengthen the entire Jewish people in the Holy Land.
The massacre at Kfar Chabad was among the deadliest of the Arab attacks to plague Israel in the 1950s. Putting an end to these raids was one of Israel’s principal objectives in its planned military campaign against Egypt.
The second reason was Egypt’s increasingly restrictive blockade of Israeli shipping.
When the Arab countries surrounding newly-independent Israel attacked it in May 1948, hoping to crush it and destroy its Jewish population, Egypt barred Israeli-flagged vessels from passing through the Suez Canal and imposed restrictions on ships of other nationalities carrying cargo to or from Israeli ports.
With overland trade routes blocked by hostile neighboring Arab countries, Israel depended heavily on its Mediterranean ports. The Egyptian blockade severely restricted its access to the Suez Canal, forcing much of its maritime trade with East Africa and Asia to take the lengthy route around the southern tip of Africa.
Toward the end of the War of Independence in 1949, Israel captured the southern tip of the Negev, gaining access to the Gulf of Aqaba. From there, ships could pass through the Straits of Tiran into the Red Sea and onward to the Indian Ocean, providing Israel with an alternative shipping route to Africa and Asia.
Egypt, however, moved to block this route as well. In 1950, Egyptian forces occupied the islands of Tiran and Sanafir at the entrance to the gulf, and military positions were established along the nearby Sinai coast, giving Egypt control over the narrow passage. As Israel began developing the port of Eilat, Egyptian forces increasingly interfered with ships attempting to reach it. In September 1955, Egypt further tightened its blockade of the straits, effectively closing Israel’s southern maritime outlet.
Meanwhile, restrictions on shipping through the Suez Canal were also growing. Although Egypt had permitted certain non-strategic goods to pass through the canal in the years following the 1949 armistice, by late 1953 it had expanded its list of prohibited cargo to include food and other civilian goods.
The United Nations Security Council had already intervened in September 1951, passing Resolution 95, which called upon Egypt to end its interference with international commercial shipping and cargo destined for Israel. In October 1956, amid the crisis over the nationalization of the canal, the Security Council again affirmed the principle of free passage through the waterway without discrimination.
Neither resolution brought an end to Egypt’s restrictions on Israeli shipping. Breaking the blockade, particularly at the Straits of Tiran, became another major objective of Israel’s planned military campaign.
A Stunning Victory
With their interests aligned, Israel, Britain, and France finalized their secret plan. Israel would attack Egypt on Oct. 29. Britain and France would then demand that both sides pull back 10 miles from the canal and that Egypt would accept Anglo-French troops along it. When Egypt refused, they would enter the war on Oct. 31.
The operation unfolded largely as planned.
On October 29, Israeli forces launched what it called Operation Kadesh. The offensive began with two daring maneuvers: Four Israeli P-51 Mustang fighter planes flew low over the Sinai Peninsula, severing overhead telephone lines with specially fitted cutting cables and, when those broke, with their wings and propellers. The operation disrupted Egyptian military communications and sowed confusion among its forces. Meanwhile, an Israeli paratrooper battalion was dropped deep inside the Sinai Peninsula, near the strategic Mitla Pass. Other Israeli forces began advancing across the border on several fronts.
The Egyptian military command was initially slow to grasp the scale of the invasion, and by the time it did, Israeli forces were deep into the Sinai. Over the following days, Israeli troops pushed steadily westward, capturing Egyptian positions and overcoming major defensive lines.
The ultimatum came on Oct. 30. The next day, British and French aircraft began bombing Egyptian airfields and military installations.
Within roughly 100 hours, Israeli forces had swept across much of the Sinai and broken through Egypt’s principal defensive lines. Egypt’s Gaza City fell on Nov. 2, and by the next day the rest of the Gaza Strip was in Israeli hands. In Sinai, armored columns advanced to within 10 miles of the Suez Canal and halted there, as planned.
One major objective remained: Sharm el-Sheikh, at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. Its capture would give Israel control of the Straits of Tiran and reopen the maritime route to Eilat.
Israeli forces began advancing toward Sharm el-Sheikh on November 2, making their way through difficult desert terrain. After several days of fighting, the Egyptian garrison surrendered on the morning of November 5. By 9:30 a.m., Sharm el-Sheikh was in Israeli hands, bringing the Sinai campaign to a close.
A Spiritual Battle
While Israeli forces were advancing across the Sinai, what seemed to be an entirely unrelated event was taking place across the Atlantic.
November 3, 1956, was Shabbat Mevarchim, the Shabbat preceding the start of a new Jewish month of Kislev. On each Shabbat Mevarchim, the Rebbe would hold a farbrengen, continuing a practice which, at the instruction of his father-in-law and predecessor, the Sixth Rebbe, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn, of righteous memory, he had begun even prior to assuming leadership of the Chabad-Lubavitch movement.
That Shabbat, the Rebbe began with a talk discussing the upcoming month of Kislev and its spiritual significance, followed by a Chassidic discourse, Maamar Mayim Rabim.2 Neither was unusual for a Shabbat Mevarchim farbrengen. It was the content of the maamar, and the emotion with which it was delivered, that set this occasion apart.
Rabbi Leibel Raskin, then a yeshivah student in New York and later the Rebbe’s emissary in Morocco, described the farbrengen in a letter to his parents in Israel, which included a partial transcript of the maamar:
“I will write a section of the maamar from this past Shabbat, Parshat Toldos … which was connected to the recent events in the Holy Land... In general, the farbrengen was very awe-inspiring, as you will see from the maamar and talk that I am sending you….”3
Another contemporary account, written by one of the Rebbe’s secretaries, Rabbi Leibel Groner, to his brother, Rabbi Yitzchok Dovid Groner, described the emotion with which the maamar was delivered: “[The Rebbe] said the beginning of the maamar while weeping, and the conclusion as well.”4
What was in this much-discussed maamar?
Building upon a verse in Shir HaShirim (Song of Songs), the Rebbe analyzed the eternal bond between G‑d and the Jewish people. Even when others, such as the angels above, or other nations below, cast doubt on the Jewish people’s commitment to G‑d’s wishes by highlighting their deficiencies, G‑d’s love and protection remains eternal.
“Many waters cannot extinguish the love, nor can rivers wash it away,” reads the verse. “Were a man to offer all the wealth of his house for love, he would be utterly scorned.”5 The Rebbe then cited the Midrash, which interprets this verse as a dialogue between G‑d and the Jewish people:
According to the Midrash, G‑d tells the Jewish people that the “many waters,” representing the multitudes of the nations of the world, can never extinguish His love for them. Nor can the “surging rivers”—representing the kings and rulers of those nations—wipe the Jewish people from the face of the earth.
The verses in Shir HaShirim continue: “We have a little sister… What shall we do for our sister on the day she is spoken for? If she is a wall, we will build upon her a silver turret, and if she is a door, we will enclose her with cedar boards.”
The Midrash, as quoted by the Rebbe, interprets these verses as a discussion among the angels in Heaven. They speak of their “little sister,” the Jewish people, whose merits are few. What should they do for her, they wonder, on the day that the nations of the world rise up to wage war against her?
Michael, the heavenly guardian of the Jewish people, responds with the next verse: “If she is a wall…” If the Jewish people stand firm like a wall among the nations, refusing to intermarry and remaining steadfast in their faith and fear of Heaven, the nations will have no power over them.
The Rebbe continued citing the Midrash, in which the nations of the world themselves voice their protest: “We sin, and the Jewish people do not sin?!” Their argument is that the Jewish people are no different from themselves. They, too, are guilty of sin—why should they enjoy G‑d's special love and protection?
G‑d responds with the words, “We have a little sister.” Just as parents do not become angry with their young daughter when she misbehaves, recognizing that she is still only a child, so too does G‑d regard the Jewish people with love despite their shortcomings.
The Midrash concludes with G‑d’s declaration: “Whether you wish it or not, you will be My people.” Even when the Jewish people declare, “We will be like the nations,” G‑d responds, “What you have in mind shall never come to pass.” Rather, He declares, “With a mighty hand… I will reign over you.”
This was just the opening paragraph of the maamar. The discourse then goes on to discuss several fundamental concepts in Chassidut, including three distinct meanings of echad, the declaration of G‑d’s oneness in the Shema prayer, and the manner in which the world itself expresses that unity. The maamar also explores how the fulfillment of practical mitzvot, even in a world where G‑dliness is concealed, connects a Jew with a level of G‑dliness beyond all revelation.
Toward the conclusion of the maamar, the Rebbe returned to the opening verses of Shir Hashirim and their interpretation in the Midrash: Even when the Jewish people are at a low spiritual level, with few merits to their credit, and the nations protest that the Jewish people are sinners just like themselves, the bond between G‑d and the Jewish people remains unchanged. Through the fulfillment of practical mitzvot, even with simple intentions, the Jewish people connect with G‑d’s very Essence.
The Rebbe concluded: “The Holy One, blessed be He, will give them all the wealth of His house…He will also grant them all the spoils and plunder of the war of Gog, for victory will be ours, speedily in our days, through our righteous Moshiach.”
To those who heard and studied the maamer in 1956, the link to the crisis unfolding in the Sinai was unmistakable.
The State of Israel was less than a decade old. Prior to its establishment, many prominent Torah scholars had opposed the movement to create a Jewish nation-state, in part because they viewed its aspirations as an attempt to make the Jewish people “like all the nations.” Even after the state’s founding, its government and public institutions were largely secular, and Torah observance was dismissed as a relic.
Yet here was the Rebbe, in the midst of a war, invoking the Midrash's defense of the Jewish people before the Heavenly Court. Even when their merits were few, even when the nations accused them of being sinners like everyone else, and even when Jews themselves declared their desire to be “like the nations,” they remain G‑d’s beloved people.
In another unusual occurrence, the Rebbe immediately edited the maamar for publication. In later years, the Rebbe would edit maamar transcripts on a regular basis, but for the first decades of his leadership, such edits were few and far between. The Rebbe also requested that the editing and publication be sped up, in order that it could be sent to Israel and studied there.
In a letter written several weeks later, the Rebbe explicitly connected the maamar to the events surrounding the war. "Enclosed is a maamar that was studied here publicly on Shabbos Mevarchim Kislev, that is, at the beginning of the events of recent weeks,” he wrote. “In it, you will find an answer, as well as my perspective, on several of the points you raised in your letter.”6
Blessings from Brooklyn
Neither did the Rebbe limit his involvement in the war to the spiritual sphere. Among the tens of thousands of Israeli soldiers called up for reserve duty in the lead up to the war, and the thousands who remained in active duty in the months that followed, were many Chabad Chassidim. The Rebbe sent them, and other soldiers and communal leaders in Israel, messages of encouragement and blessing.
The Rebbe referred to the Chassidim’s participation in the army operation in a letter written several months later:
Incidentally, I am aware that several Chabad Chassidim were among the first to take part in the military operation you mention, and that on the first Shabbos in Gaza, they held a seudat shlishit in the Chabad tradition.7
In his missives to the soldiers, the Rebbe also emphasized the importance of conducting military life in accordance with Torah and Halacha, invoking the verse “And your camp shall be holy,” in which the Torah requires a special standard of holiness in a military camp.
In a letter to one soldier, the Rebbe wrote:
Please extend my regards to all those around you, and convey to them my heartfelt wishes that their camp be holy with the holiness of Torah and mitzvot, and that G‑d, their G‑d, walk in the midst of their camp, to save them and deliver their enemies before them.8
The insistence on maintaining holiness in the army was not limited to his correspondence with Chassidic soldiers. In an interview several months later, he raised concerns about certain aspects of military life that did not meet the Halachic standards of modesty. The Rebbe explained:
A non-observant Jew entering the army, even in peacetime, must take upon himself an additional measure of holiness… If the condition of “your camp shall be holy” is not fulfilled, there can be no “deliver your enemies before you.”
I therefore believe that the religious Jews should have convened a trial, what is called here a “court-martial,” for the most serious form of treason: endangering the entire army.9
Snatching Defeat From the Jaws of Victory
Meanwhile, events continued to unfold in the Middle East. On Nov. 5, British and French paratroopers landed near Port Said, the northern entrance to the Suez Canal. The following day, after days of aerial bombardment, British Royal Marines stormed the beaches, supported by tanks and additional troops arriving by helicopter.
In a tactic that may sound familiar, Nasser ordered Egyptian troops to wear civilian clothing and had weapons distributed to the local civilians. British and French troops found themselves fighting in densely populated neighborhoods, where armed civilians and soldiers dressed as civilians fired from buildings and rooftops. The tactics complicated efforts to distinguish combatants from noncombatants and contributed to civilian casualties.
The fighting in Port Said, together with the refusal of the United States to support the British and French intervention, intensified an already fierce international backlash against the campaign.
The United Nations called for an immediate ceasefire. Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin threatened military intervention on Egypt’s behalf, warning Britain, France, and Israel of possible Soviet attacks, including the use of rocket weapons. President Eisenhower, alarmed by the prospect of a direct confrontation between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, feared that the crisis could escalate into a third world war.
In Israel, however, the mood remained jubilant. On Nov. 6, Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan read a message from Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to thousands of soldiers gathered at Sharm el-Sheikh for a ceremony celebrating the successful campaign. In it, Ben-Gurion proclaimed that “Yotvat (Tiran), will once again be part of the Third Kingdom of Israel!”
The following day, Ben-Gurion delivered a victory speech at the Knesset, comparing the military triumph to the revelation at Mount Sinai. He declared the 1949 Armistice Agreement with Egypt null and void, insisting that Israel would not permit the deployment of United Nations troops within its territory or in any of the areas it had captured.
But the international response was already threatening to undo the military achievements.
Ben-Gurion’s speech drew further pressure from Washington. On Nov. 7, Eisenhower sent him a message demanding compliance with U.N. resolutions calling for an Israeli withdrawal. By the following day, Ben-Gurion had softened his position, informing the American president that Israel was prepared to withdraw from Sinai once satisfactory arrangements had been made for the deployment of an international force.
Britain and France were facing pressure of their own. On Nov. 6, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden announced a ceasefire, catching his French and Israeli allies by surprise. The following day, the U.N. established the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the first international peacekeeping force of its kind, tasked with supervising the ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign troops.
The diplomatic pressure was accompanied by a severe financial crisis in Britain. A run on the pound sterling was rapidly draining British currency reserves, while the Eisenhower administration withheld support for emergency financial assistance until Britain agreed to end its military operation. Faced with the prospect of a financial collapse, the British government had little choice but to comply. By Dec. 22, all British and French troops had withdrawn from Egypt.
Israel, however, continued to resist demands for a full withdrawal. Having captured the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, its leaders were determined not to return to the conditions that had prevailed before the war. They demanded assurances that Egypt would not again close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and that the Gaza Strip would no longer serve as a base for terror attacks.
Eisenhower rejected these demands as conditions for withdrawal. As the standoff continued into early 1957, his administration considered economic sanctions against Israel. Among the measures discussed were suspending American government assistance and restricting private financial support, including tax-deductible donations and Israeli bond sales in the United States. These private contributions and investments amounted to approximately $100 million annually, making the threat particularly serious for Israel’s economy.
Under mounting pressure, Israel gradually withdrew from most of Sinai, while holding on to Gaza and the Sharm el-Sheikh area. Negotiations continued over the final two territories, with Israel seeking guarantees that its principal security concerns would be addressed.
Ultimately, Israel agreed to withdraw on the basis of American statements supporting freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and understandings concerning the deployment of UNEF in Gaza and at Sharm el-Sheikh. These fell short of the binding guarantees Israel had initially sought.
By March 8, 1957, the Israeli withdrawal was complete.
Some of the arrangements that followed provided Israel with tangible benefits. The Straits of Tiran remained open to Israeli shipping for the next decade, allowing Eilat to develop as a gateway to Africa and Asia. UNEF troops stationed along the Egyptian-Israeli border also helped maintain a period of relative calm.
But other Israeli expectations were frustrated almost immediately. Israel had anticipated that the U.N. would assume responsibility for administering Gaza, preventing Egypt from reestablishing the conditions that had allowed the fedayeen terror attacks. Yet within days of Israel’s withdrawal, Egypt announced the restoration of its administration in Gaza. An Egyptian governor arrived on March 14, and Egyptian authorities gradually resumed civilian administrative and policing functions, although UNEF troops remained deployed in the territory.
The arrangements at the Straits of Tiran ultimately proved temporary as well. In May 1967, Nasser ordered the withdrawal of UNEF and once again closed the straits to Israeli shipping, leading directly to the Six-Day War.
For Egypt, meanwhile, the outcome was a political and diplomatic triumph. Despite the defeat of its military forces and the loss of Sinai during the fighting, Nasser emerged with control of the Suez Canal intact. His ability to withstand an invasion by Britain, France, and Israel greatly enhanced his standing across the Arab world, where he was celebrated as a leader who had successfully challenged the former colonial powers on the one hand, and the Jews on the other.
Britain and France, by contrast, emerged weakened. Their inability to sustain the military operation in the face of American opposition demonstrated the limits of their power, accelerating the decline of their influence in the Middle East. The crisis also underscored the dominant positions of the United States and Soviet Union in international affairs.
Israel had achieved major military successes and secured a decade of relative calm along its Egyptian border, but it had also been compelled to surrender all the territory it had captured without obtaining the formal peace settlement or comprehensive security guarantees it sought.
The Suez Crisis thus became a classic example of a country losing on the battlefield while emerging victorious in the diplomatic arena. Egypt had suffered a crushing military defeat, yet Nasser emerged from the crisis politically stronger than ever.
Now Is the Time
As the war came to a close, the Rebbe continued to seek regular updates on the Chassidim who had been called up. Towards the end of November 1956, the Rebbe wrote to Rabbi Shneur Zalman Garelik, the rabbi of Kfar Chabad:
I hereby acknowledge receipt of his letter... bearing the good news that all of Anash are safe and well and have returned home safely… It is surprising that since the telegram, I have not received any word from its senders that they returned home.10
His concern extended beyond Israel to Jewish communities in Arab countries, where the war had heightened tensions. In a letter to Rabbi Michoel Lipsker, the Chabad emissary in Meknes, Morocco, the Rebbe expressed his relief at receiving reassuring news that they were doing well.11
Throughout the months of the conflict, the Rebbe also urged for greater Torah observance from all residents of the Holy Land. When some argued that the circumstances made it an inappropriate time to press for religious observance, the Rebbe rejected that reasoning. “This is like a sick person telling his doctor that since he is weak and his health is poor, he has no time to take the prescribed medicines,” he wrote. “He will then continue his previous conduct, even though it is making his illness dangerous, and when he recovers, he will consider the medicines being suggested. The analogy is clear.”12
The Rebbe also encouraged Chassidim to make use of the heightened Jewish pride and enthusiasm felt among the Israeli public during and after the war, seeing it as an opportunity to inspire greater mitzvah observance.
Much of the Rebbe’s correspondence from this period, including his letters to soldiers, communal leaders and Chabad emissaries during the war and its aftermath, is preserved in Volume 13 of Igrot Kodesh, covering the years 1956–1957.
A Missed Opportunity
With the crisis over, life in Israel appeared to return to normal. But while celebrating the miracles that had occurred, the Rebbe pointed to a serious flaw in the attitudes that had prevailed during the war and its aftermath. In a conversation with the journalist and activist Yosef Klarman, the Rebbe described the war’s effect on Israeli youth.
“When the Sinai Desert was liberated, then-Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion proclaimed that we had reached the third Jewish kingdom, and would retain it forever…,” he said. “Can one be surprised that, under the impact of such tremendous propaganda, young people in particular, and soldiers all the more so, were filled with an extraordinary enthusiasm that transcended all bounds of reason and emotion?
“Then Sinai was returned. That enthusiasm froze and disappeared completely, and in its place emerged an increasingly bitter emptiness…They dismissed many accepted values with a breath and began living by the motto, ‘Eat and drink, for tomorrow…’ For this reason, they were known at the time as the ‘Espresso Generation,’ because they spent their days and nights in cafés.”
According to the recollections of Rabbi Chaim Gutnick, a prominent Australian rabbi, the Rebbe went so far as to describe the war and its miraculous victories as a missed opportunity to bring about the ultimate redemption.13
“If the Jewish people would have believed that their salvation would come from G‑d rather than from French MIGs and British warplanes, all would have been different,” he recalled the Rebbe telling him.
The Rebbe explained that the victory had been achieved through the Torah and mitzvot performed by Jews throughout the world. He pointed to the extraordinary willingness of Israeli soldiers to answer the call to fight:
“Think about it: a young man in Israel was summoned, handed an Uzi, and told: ‘Leave your wife and children at home and go to El-Arish to fight.’ In every war there are draft-dodgers; yet here, no Jew…refused to fight.”
Had Israel’s leaders seized that same spirit of dedication and sacrifice to inspire a renewed commitment to Judaism, the Rebbe said, “everything would be different.”
A Recurring Pattern
Another issue the Rebbe would return to repeatedly was the way Israel had conducted the Sinai Campaign and the negotiations that followed.
In the years following the 1967 Six-Day War, the Rebbe criticized Israeli leaders, sometimes sharply, for their willingness to surrender hard-won military gains, place their trust in empty promises, and allow political considerations to take precedence over the protection of human life. At first, the Rebbe raised these concerns privately. When those efforts proved futile, he began addressing them publicly.
The Rebbe repeatedly cited the Sinai Campaign as an example of the dangers of this approach. He pointed to the international guarantees that had proved unreliable, Israel’s failure to see the campaign through to its conclusion, and the distinction between public diplomatic pressure, often intended to save face, and the tacit permission that might exist to complete a military operation.
These themes would recur throughout the following decades, as the Rebbe saw the same mistakes being repeated in successive Israeli conflicts. He compared the decision to halt a military operation prematurely to a surgeon who stops operating at the sight of blood, leaving the underlying problem unresolved and making further operations necessary.
The Rebbe was particularly critical of allowing political calculations to override military and security considerations. In 1982, during Operation Peace for Galilee, he pointed to the recurring pattern:14
“There are ‘statesmen’ who give political considerations precedence over security considerations…This is not the first time such a mistake has been made, giving precedence to the opinions of ‘statesmen’ over those of military experts in matters of security. This mistake has been repeated on numerous occasions: with the signing of the disastrous Camp David Accords, during the Yom Kippur War, the Six-Day War, and the Sinai Campaign.
“On each occasion, the opinions of the ‘statesmen’ were given precedence, even though they were in direct contradiction to the opinions of military experts, whose assessments were based on security considerations. As the military experts explicitly warned, including during Operation Peace for Galilee, such decisions would lead to additional casualties, G‑d forbid!
“For the sake of the political considerations of ‘statesmen,’ Jewish lives are lost, each one of them an ‘entire world,’ without accomplishing anything!”
The Rebbe’s position on Israel’s security was not based merely on what seemed right, nor was it an abstract spiritual principle detached from the practical realities of military strategy and diplomacy. His arguments, guided by the principles laid out in the eternal Torah, drew on concrete facts, military assessments, and a careful consideration of the circumstances on the ground.
The Rebbe’s views on Israel’s security, originally expressed across decades of talks, letters and private conversations, have recently been compiled into a coherent presentation and published in English as Make Peace: A Strategic Guide for Achieving Lasting Peace in Israel, followed more recently by a Hebrew edition.
What consistently distinguished the Rebbe’s approach was that he viewed the events through the lens of Halacha, in which the protection of human life takes precedence over diplomatic considerations.
It was on this combination of practical reality and Halachic principle that the Rebbe built the framework he would articulate so forcefully in the decades that followed. After decades of “brave” diplomatic initiatives that have resulted only in bitter failure, perhaps it is time for the leaders of Israel to—in the words of the Rebbe—“realize that the Jewish people are one, an indestructible nation bound up with the one G‑d, and conduct themselves in accordance with the one Torah. When they take this stand, Israel will be victorious over its enemies … and the nations of the world will come to the assistance of the Jewish people, who walk in the path of their faith.”15 .







